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Background
The Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
was formed in 1980 to promote regional 
development and to reduce economic 
dependence particularly, but not only, 
on the Republic o f  South Africa (RSA), 
their powerful white-ruled neighbour. 
The countries of the SADCC are 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe;
In the late seventies the RSA launched 
the idea of the Constellation o f  South­
ern African States (CONSAS), a region­
al grouping made up of a South African 
sun orbited by its independent neigh­
bours. It was in part as a reaction to this 
further attempt by the RSA to con­
solidate its regional hegemony, that the 
SADCC was formed. South Africa re­
sponded to the creation of the SADCC 
by launching a series of strategies to 
'Undermine t,"especially- against—the 
socialist member states, Mozambique 
and Angola.
In 1979 the stature of the progressive 
members was at a peak, with Angola, 
Mozambique and Tanzania professing 
some form of socialist ideology. These 
states also contained all of the SADCC’s 
coastline and hence ports putting them 
in an apparently influential position vis 
a vis the states of the interior. By 1986 
Mozambique and Angola were fighting 
for their lives and Tanzania was in dire 
economic straits. The balance in the 
SADCC had tipped to the more pro­
sperous market economy interior states.
Due to the closure of the Beira and 
Maputo lines in 1976 during the Zim­
babwean liberation war and the closure 
of the Benguela line during the second 
war of liberation in Angola, thestates of 
the interior became even more depend­
ent on the RSA for their external trade. 
Between 1976 and 1980 the only non- 
South African rail route to the coast was 
the long haul up the Tazara line to Dar es 
Salaam in Tanzania (see map). With the 
independence of Zimbabwe the routes
to both Beira and Maputo reopened.
South Africa almost immediately em­
barked on a strategy of attempting to 
ensure the continued closure of the An­
golan and<Mozambican routes in order 
to maintain its control over the external 
trade of the landlocked SADCC states. 
They did this both by direct sabotage by 
the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) and indirectly via surrogate 
rebels (MNR and UNITA) who they 
trained, supplied and ran. This rapid in­
crease in aggression by the RSA against 
its neighbours also coincided with the 
election of Reagan in the USA and the 
subsequent policy of collaboration with 
the South African regime in ’’rolling 
back communism” via ’’constructive 
engagement” with that regime.
From 1984 Zimbabwe started sending 
troops to help Mozambique guard the 
Beira corridor which contained an oil 
pipeline, the railroad and an all weather 
highway. But, by mid-1986 the line was 
still carrying only one train per day-and- 
both the Maputo (Chiqualaquala) and 
Benguela (Lobito) lines were out of 
action.
The political orientations of the 
governments of the SADCC vary con­
siderably especially as regards their 
policy towards South Africa, from a vir­
tual state of war in the case of Angola to 
outright collaboration in the case of 
Malawi. The SADCC states also vary 
greatly in size, population and in their 
economies.
Table 1 gives basic economic and 
demographic data for the states of the 
SADCC in 1983. The region has a total 
surface area of 4.9 million square kilo­
metres and a population of 66 million, 
giving an overall density of 13.5 per- 
sons/kmJ. The total SADCC GDP was 
21.6 G USD in 1983 and the average 
GNP/capita was 326 USD, twice the size 
of the total export receipts of 5.4 G USD 
(Table 1).
Mining in the SADCC
As a grouping, the SADCC derives over 
sixty per cent of its foreign exchange
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Table 1
SADCC: basic economic data 1983 
(in USD)
Country
Area
k-km2 Vo*
Population 
Mil Vo*
GDP
GUSD, Vo*
GNP/cap 
USD Vo +
ExLdebt
GUSD
[
Vo*
Exports
M USD Vo*
Angola 1 247 25 8.2 12 4.18 19 506 155 2.11 18 1 572 29
Botswana 600 12 1.0 2 0.89 4 833 256 0.21 2 611 11
Lesotho 30 1 1.5 2 0.35 . 2 460 141 0.15 1 47 T
Malawi 118 2 6.6 10 1.33 6 210 64 0.72 6 220 4
Mozambique 799 16 13.2 20 1.70 8 130 40 1.66 14 132 2
Swaziland 17 0 0.7 1 0.50 2 870 267 0.20 2 271 5
Tanzania 945 19 20.8 31 4.55 21 240 74 2.58 22 566,, 10
Zambia 753 15 6.3 10 3.35 16 580 178 2.64 22 869; 16
Zimbabwe 391 8 7.9 12 4.73 22 740 227 1.50 13 1 133. . 21
SADCC 
total (avg) 4 900 100 66.2 100 2158 100 326 100 11.77 100 5 421 100
Notes
Vo* = Vo of SADCC total; Vo + = Vo of SADCC weighted average.
Table 2
SADCC: basic mineral data 1983
Country . G U SD
GDP
Vo
Min Vo*
Production
M U SD
Angola 4.2 26 239 1 646
Botswana 0.9 28 255 590
Lesotho 0.4 1 9 19
Malawi 1.3 0 0 7
Mozambique 1.7 1 9 5
Swaziland 0.5 3 27 23
Tanzania 4.6 2 18 45
Zambia 3.4 15 136 1 040
Zimbabwe 4.7 8 73 470
SADCC
total (avg) 21.6 11 100 3 845
Exports y Vo**
Vo + Total Min’s Vo Min Vo + Vo* "Employ
43 1 572 1 506 96 46 . .157 9
15 611 461 75 14 124 27
0 47 19 41 1 67 9
0 220 0 0 0 0 1
0 132 3 2 0 3 1
1 271 14 5 0 8 3
1 566 45 8 1 13 2
27 869 834 96 25 157 16
12 1 133 419 37 13 61 6
100 5 421 3 302 61 100 100
Notes
Vo* = SADCC weighted average Vo; V®+ = Vo SADCC total; Vo** = Vo total formal employment.
Sources
SADCC, 1985 and SADCC States Govt data.
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from mineral exports worth, in 1983,3.3 
G USD (Thble 2). Mineral dependence 
varies dramatically from state to state 
from nothing (Malawi) to 96 per cent of 
exports and 26 per cent of GDP (Ango­
la). Four countries make up almost all 
(97 per cent) of the region’s mineral out­
put of 3.8 G USD. These are Angola (43 
per cent, oil and diamonds), Zambia (27 
per cent, copper and cobalt), Botswana 
(15 per cent, diamonds and copper/ 
nickel) and Zimbabwe (12 per cent, vari­
ous minerals). Angola, Zambia and 
Botswana are virtual mono-mineral 
economies with one mineral accounting 
for from 60 to 90 per cent of total export 
receipts.
Table 3 gives production for SADCC 
by mineral ranked by value in 1983. In 
that year oil from Angola accounted for 
37 per cent of the total regional mineral 
output. This was followed by copper 
(959 M USD) and diamonds (686 M 
USD). Together these three minerals 
made up 80 per cent of the total yaluejn  
terms of world output the only minerals
in the region with a significant share of 
global production are diamonds (23 per 
cent) and cobalt (14 per cent) though the 
proportions are higher when considered 
against ’’western” output only.
The minerals that are produced main­
ly in the interior and have a unit value 
too low to be airfreighted, making them 
vulnerable to export route disruptions, 
are copper (620 kt), nickel (28 kt), ferro- 
chrome (240 kt), steel (659 kt) and 
asbestos (182 kt). Coal is mainly con­
sumed in the countries of production, 
and about half of steel output is con­
sumed in the region, which means that 
every year the interior states of the 
SADCC need to get roughly 1.5 Gt of 
various minerals to the coast to earn the 
foreign exchange vital to their econo­
mies. The main countries affected in 
this way are Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana.
Ownership
By far the most important transnational 
mining house in the region is the Anglo
American — De Beers mining conso 
tium of South Africa. They contn 
most of. the region’s nickel productio 
(BNC and BCL), coal production (War 
kie), diamond production (Debswana 
about half of the ferro-chrome outpi 
(Zimalloys) and 27 per cent of ZCCM i 
Zambia which produces 93 per cent c 
the region’s copper and 90 per cent c 
the cobalt. Turner Newall of the U1 
controls almost all of the SADCC 
asbestos output (Shabanie & Mashab 
Mines Ltd) and Union Carbide of th 
USA controls the other half of ferrc 
chrome production (Zimasco). All pel 
roleum production is controlled by th 
Angolan parastatal Sonangol in pari 
nership with oil transnationals prir 
cipally Gulf Oil of the USA (Cabgocj 
now owned by Chevron. Other transna 
tionals are Rio Tinto-Zinc and Lonrhi 
of the UK (gold) and Amax of the US  ^
(copper/nickel), but the latter compan; 
has been getting rid of its assets in th 
region over the last few years.1_______
Table 3
SADCC: production of principal minerals
(in kt) —
Volume —
%* Value Producers
Mineral 1970 1975 1980 1983 world MUSD % SADCC 1983
Oil (Mt) 5.1 8.8 7.4 8.9 0.3 1 422.3 An(100)
Copper 713.2 701.2 652.6 620.3 7.6 958.8 Za(93)Bo(3)Zi(3)
Diamonds (Mcts) 3.6 3.9 7.0 12.4 22.7 686.3 Bo(88)An(10)Ta(2)
Gold (t) 14.0 11.3 11.7 14.5 1.0 193.9 Zi(98)Za(2)
Nickel 8.6 15.6 30.5 28.4 4.2 122.2 Bo(64)Zi(3 6)
Fe-Chrome nd 196.7 231.4 240.0 na 118.6 Zi(100)
Asbestos 221.0 299.1 284.6 182.3 4.5 80.9 Zi(84)Sw(15)
Steel na . 544.7 813.5 659.1 0.1 85.0 Zi(98)Mo(l)An(l)
Coal (Mt) 4.1 4.9 4.3 4.3 0.1 63.1 Zi(77)Za(10)Bo(9)
Cobalt 2.1 1.9 3.6 2.7 13.8 30.9 Za(90)Bo(8)Zi(2)
Notes
* = of world production in 1983; An = Angola; Bo = Botswana; Mo = Mozambique; Sw = Swaziland; Th = Tknzania; Za = Zambia: 
Zi = Zimbabwe.
Source:
SADCC Government Statistics and BGS, 1985.
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South African destablization
The effect of destabilization on the 
minerals industries of the SADCC by 
the RSA and its surrogates can be con­
sidered at various levels:
• The first and obvious loss is in the case 
of direct destruction o f  mining plant 
and equipment, as has been done in 
Angola and Mozambique. This effect is 
quantifiable in terms of value.
• The second knock-on effect is in terms 
of the loss o f  mineral production in 
terms of forfeited foreign exchange 
earnings. This again is quantifiable, but 
the resultant effect of .the lost forex on 
importi|ependent sectors of the econo­
my is difficult to determine.
• Thirdly, related to the second effect, is 
that the cessation of mining will cause 
losses and possible closures to the 
downstream domestic industries using
M ineral inputs.'These losses'are difficult 
to determine.
• The fourth and widespread effect is 
that the destruction of transport routes 
forces minerals to be exported via more 
distant and more costly, generally South 
African, routes. The higher transport 
costs can be quantified, but the effect of 
the higher unit cost of the mineral at end 
market on the profitability and output 
of the mining operation would be dif­
ficult to accurately determine.
• The last and most elusive effect is that 
of .’’lost opportunity”. The regional in­
stability brought about by South Afri­
can destabilization results in otherwise 
viable mining prospects remaining un­
exploited. The poor security situation 
also causes a decline in foreign invest­
ment in the mining and other sectors of 
the region. The effects of this lost 
capital inflow on the mining industry 
and on the economy in general would be 
virtually impossible to quantify.
There are also a myriad of smaller ef­
fects such as the loss of markets to 
domestic mining inputs manufacturers, 
the higher costs of imported inputs to 
the minerals industry, the loss of ex­
perienced mining personnel murdered
in raids, etc . . .  , which would be ex­
tremely difficult to quantify given the 
lack of accurate data in the region.
Most probably the greatest effect on 
the SADCC of destabilization, but 
which doesn’t directly relate to the min­
erals sector, is the enormous amount of 
resources that the states under attack 
have had to divert from economic recon­
struction to defence. The total figure for 
this wastage must run into tens of bil­
lions of USD, but the total losses in­
cluding the diversion of scarce man­
agerial and administrative cadres to 
defence are unquantifiable.
Due to the widespread: ripple effects 
of destabilization on the rest of the 
economy, only three more or less quan­
tifiable effects will be considered in this 
analysis, namely:
• Direct destruction of mines
• Forfeited production/exports
• Higher transport costs.
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SADF sabotage ofNamibe line linking 
the Kassinga iron ore mines with the 
port of Namibe (Angola).
The socialist economies: 
the prime targets 
Angola
The state that has suffered the most 
from destabilization is certainly Angola 
where South African aggression started 
with a full-scale invasion in 1975. The 
direct damage to the economy during 
this invasion and the scorched earth 
policy of the SADF during their retreat 
in early 1976 was estimated at 6.7 G 
USD at thaL.time3. Since then South 
Africa has been in and out of southern 
Angola constantly, both in order to pro­
tect their surrogate rebel movement 
UNITA from Angolan offensives and in 
order to constantly keep Angolan re­
sources tied down by the war. The RSA 
usually uses the excuse of ’’hot pursuit” 
of SWAPO nationalists to justify their 
invasions, but the location and type of 
targets hit-bear-no relation to the ac^
tivities of SWAPO, who are fighting to 
end South Africa’s illegal occupation of 
Namibia. Table 4
From 1976 to 1981 damage from at­
tacks by the RSA has been estimated at 
1 G USD and substantial damage has 
been wrought during subsequent South 
African invasions, SADF sabotage 
squads attacks and UNITA banditry de­
struction. Angola currently diverts 
about 40 per cent of the national budget 
to defence against South African de­
stabilization.3
The USA has also been involved in the 
destabilization of Angola since 1975 via 
Zaire and South Africa. In 1985 the 
Reagan administration managed to get 
the Clarke Amendment repealed there­
by allowing open support to the UNITA 
rebels and in 1986 UNITA was given 77 
M USD and sophisticated military hard­
ware by the USA.
The minerals industry 
• Direct damage
The Kassinga iron mines in the south of 
the country have been out of action 
since the first South African invasion in 
1975. Over the last few years there have 
been several attacks on the diamond
Angola: production loss 1975—1980
Iron ore (Mt) Diamonds (Mcts)
Year prod loss prod loss
1970-74* 2.21 5.70
1975 0.99 1.22 5.60 0.10
1976 0.34 1.87 2.50 3.20
1977 0.53 1.68 0 5.70
1978 0.70 1.51 0 5.70
1979 " 0.84 1.37 0 5.70
1980 1.50 0.71 0 5.70
1981 1.40 0.81 0 5.70
1982 . 1.22 0.99 0 5.70
1983 1.01 1.20 0 5.70
1984 0.92 1.29 0 5.70
1985 0.72 1.49 0 5.70
1986e 0.50 1.71 0 5.70
Total 10.67 15.85 8.10 60.30
Notes
* = average 1970—74; e = estimate.
Sources
British Geological Survey, World Mineral Statistics 1976 and 1985; Ministerio de Plano de 
Angola, Colecta de Alguns Elem entos. . . .  Luanda 1986.
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I  fields in the north-west of the country 
I and the oil industry was hit in 1981 when 
I  a SADF sabotage squad attacked the
(refinery in Luanda causing 36.6 M USD worth of damage: In 1985 a SADF sabotage squad was apprehended in the 1 Cabinda enclave. The squad had been 
I sent to sabotage the American run oil
!f installations and then to leave evidence 
I  that would attribute the attack to 
fu N IT A .
I  • Forfeited mineral production 
|  Iron ore: From 1970 to 1975 output from 
I  the Kassinga iron mines averaged 5.7 
|  Mt/year (Table 4 and Fig 2). Lost pro- 
I duction since then would therefore total 
I 60.3 Mt of ore. The average price of iron 
r ore over this period in deflated USD was 
roughly 35 USD4, which would give a 
; total foreign exchange loss of 2.11 bil­
lion 1986 USD, assuming that no expan- 
_ sioo. oL iron ore mining would have 
taken place under peaceful conditions. 
The resource base both at Kassinga and 
Kassala-Kitungo (south-east of Luan­
da) is huge and an expansion of produc­
tion could well have taken places had 
conditions been conducive:5 
Diamonds: Pre-1975 diamond pro­
duction from the alluvial deposits of 
north-eastern Angola was averaging 
2.21 Mcarats/year (Table 4 arid Fig 2).
Production fell to 0.34 Mcarats in 1976, 
then picked up to 1.5 Mcarats in 1980 
before falling to 0.72 Mcarats by 1985, 
principally due to the deteriorating se­
curity situation. Lost production since 
1975 would therefore be 15.85 Mcarats 
worth 1.15 G USD at 1984 (deflated) 
prices, assuming no expansion of pro­
duction. Angola’s diamond resource 
base is enormous and in 1980 it was diamonds and iron ore^  was 58 million 
estimated that the alluvial reserves escudos or roughly 2 M USD (4.5 M 
could sustain a rate of production worth 1986 USD)7, but the lost value of these 
in excess of 500 M USD/year using only minerals since 1975 has not been deter- 
installed capacity at the time.6 Lost mined due to a lack of data. 
potential production would therefore be The total value of forfeited mineral
roughlyTG~USD,lExctudmgthe- unde-— p ro d u c tio n d u e to -S o u th -A fr ic a n_
veloped in situ (kimberlite pipes) poten- destabilization of Angola since 1975 
tial which has not been exploited due to would therefore be of the order of 3.8 G
the security situation.
Oil: Due to the off-shore nature of oil 
production, output has not been af­
fected by South African destabilization 
except for 1976 when production fell 
due to both the South African and 
Zairean invasions. Lost output for 1976 
was 24.6 Mbbl worth 282 M USD at that 
time (500 million 1986 USD).
Other minerals: Pre-1975 Angola pro­
duced a variety of minerals from gene­
rally small scale operations. The majori­
ty of these shut down at the time of the 
1975 South African invasion and have 
never reopened. In 1973 the total value 
of mineral production, other than oil,
Figure 2 .
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 7 7 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 1986
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USD assuming production at pre-1975 
rates, a penalty that the new Angolan 
government could ill afford to pay.
• Transport
As a coastal country, Angola generally 
has not suffered from the RSA 
’’transport premium” as have the states 
of the interior, but before 1975 the 
Benguela line, running from the Zam- 
bia/Zaire copperbelt to the port of 
Lobito, used to be a major mineral ex­
port route. In 1973 Lobito handled 2.56 
Mt of cargo, mainly minerals from Zai­
re’s Shaba Province and the Zambian 
copperbelt. Since 1975 the line has vir­
tually been but of action due to SADF/ 
UNITA sabotage. This has not only 
caused lost tariffs for Angola, but has 
also meant that Zambia has had to use 
more expensive routes to export its 
copper.
IiTAngola’s case :he“other, unquan- 
tifiable, effects of destabilization, are 
far greater than the quantifiable ones 
analysed above. The total extra expen­
diture on defence alone would be greater 
than the total value of forfeited mineral 
production, while the effects of the 
diversion of human resources to the war 
effort permeates all sectors of the 
economy. In 1985 alone, Angola spent 
1.15 G USD on defence, 38 per cent of 
the national budget.8
Mozambique
Second on the RSA’s target list in terms 
of the intensity of aggression is the Peo­
ple’s Republic o f Mozambique (PRM). 
From independence in 1975 to 1980 the 
destabilization of Mozambique was left 
up to the then Rhodesian regime of Ian 
Smith, who were receiving substantial 
military aid from the South Africans 
and South African aircraft were used in 
invasions/attacks on Mozambique. The 
cost of supporting the Zimbabwean 
struggle was estimated at 556 M USD in 
1984.’
With the independence of Zimbabwe 
in 1980 the South Africans took over the 
show including the running of the rebel 
MNR ’’movement” which had been the
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creation of the Rhodesian security 
forces.10
In 1984 the PRM was forced into the, 
now infamous, Nkomati Accord with 
the South Africans in which they under­
took to neutralize the South African na­
tionalist movement, the ANC, on their 
territory and the RSA would cease to 
run the MNR. But the South Africans 
have continued to train and supply the 
MNR even though the PRM has kept to 
its side of the accord.
As with Angola, South African de- 
stabilization of Mozambique takes the 
form of direct action by SADF sabotage 
squads as well as via banditry by a sur­
rogate movement (the MNR), but thus 
far the RSA has not resorted to full- 
scale invasions. Due to the pre-1975 in­
tegration of the Mozambican economy 
into the South African economy, it has 
also been subjected to economic sabo- 
tage by South Africa through the reduc­
tion of the trade through Mozambique 
and the reduction of the number of 
Mozambican migrant miners working 
on the South African mines.
The minerals industry
Due to centuries of Portuguese colonial 
neglect the Mozambican minerals in­
dustry was tiny in 1975 (independence) 
even though the country has substantial 
mineral resources. Most of the new gov­
ernment’s efforts in the minerals sector 
since 1975 have been in prospecting and 
surveying in order to systematically 
assess the nation’s mineral potential. By 
the early eighties this had been done for 
several deposits and a rapid increase in 
mineral output was planned, but it was 
at this time that the RSA stepped in and 
rapidly escalated its destabilization of 
the Mozambican economy via its sur­
rogate movement, the MNR.11 By 1986 
the mining industry had virtually col­
lapsed due to the deteriorating security 
situation in the countryside. The two 
most important minerals produced are 
coal in Tete Province and tantalum pen- 
toxide in Zambezia Province.
• Direct damage
Due to sabotage of the line from the 
Moatize coal fields to the port of Beira, 
coal production has all but ceased. The 
TkjOj pegmatite workings (Morrua, 
Marropino and Muiane) were attacked 
in 1983 (when six Soviet technicians 
were killed), 1984, 1985 and yet another 
attack was reported in June 1986 in 
which a Mozambican geologist was 
murdered. The workings are still 
operating, but at a fraction of their 
capacity. The Mavita asbestos mine 
(Manica Province) was attacked in 1978 
and again in 1985 when most ‘df the 
plant was destroyed putting the mine 
out of action. At the erfd of 1984 the 
Tulua felspar mine in Nampula Pro­
vince was attacked and the Mine Chief 
was murdered, while attacks on the 
limestone quarries supplying the_ce^_ 
ment plants of Maputo and Beiradiave 
caused cement production to fall to 15 
per cent of national capacity.12 
• Forfeited mineral production:
Coal: Production from Moatize used to 
run at roughly 500 kt of steam and cok­
ing coal per year, all of which was ex­
ported. Production fell in 1977 and 1978 
due to an underground explosion in 
which 130 miners lost their lives and 
after which the mines were nationalized. 
With East German technical aid pro­
duction then rapidly increased to 535 kt 
in 1981 before collapsing to virtually 
nothing in 1986 due to the destruction 
of the railway. Planned production, pre­
destabilization, should have been 1 Mt 
by 1986.
Figure 3 gives two scenarios (A1 and 
A2) for coal production assuming an ' 
operating railway. A1 continues the rate 
of increase attained for the years i 978 to 
1981, reaching the planned tarp of 1 
Mt by 1986, while A2 assumes th..i pro­
duction continued at the same rate as 
1981. Forfeited production using scena­
rio A1 would total 3.87 Mt (Table 5), 
while A2 (no change) would total 2.5 
Mt. Using the price obtained for coal ex­
ports in 1981 (41.2 USD/t13) the loss 
would be 159.4 M USD for A1 and 103
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Mozambique: production loss 1982—86
fear
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 
I986e
fatal
i No te:
: = estimate.
prod
Coal (kt) 
plan loss prod
Cement (kt) 
plan loss prod
Ta2Os (t) 
plan loss
46.0 46 0 535 535 0 261 261 0
29.1 60 30.9 67 630 563 270 290 20
21.2 76 54.8 59 720 661 188 320 132
10.5 90 79.5 39 810 771 110 345 235
5.5 105 99.5 20 910 890 85 370 285
5.0 120 115.0 20 1000 980 50 400 350
713 451 379.7 205 4 070 3 865 703 1725 1022
Source:
British Geological Survey, World Mineral Statistics 1976 and 1985; Ministerio dos Recursos Minerals de Mozambique Unpublished data, Ma­
puto 1986.
Figure 3
------------1-----------------1--------------1------------------ 1---------------- 1---------------- 1---------------1— ■
MOZAMBIQUE : MINERAL PRODUCTION 
ACTUAL AND PLANNED
SOURCE : TABLE S
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 1986
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M USD for A2 or, in deflated 1986 USD, 
193.2 and 124.8 respectively. Moatize 
has ample high grade reserves and 
therefore it w ouldbe reasonable- to 
assume that production would have 
continued according to plan under 
peaceful conditions (Table 5).
Tantalum pentoxide: By 1981 the 
reserves of the artisanal pegmatite 
workings had been systematically asses­
sed for the first time and a production 
plan to increase output to 1201 by 1986 
had been formulated. The equipment 
for this expansion was purchased but 
still awaits installation pending ah im­
provement in the security situation.
In Figure 3, Ta2Os production is 
treated in the same way as for coal, with 
a ”production-to-plan” scenario (Bl) 
and a ”no change” scenario (B2). For­
feited production for Bl would total 
379.71 (Table 5) and for B2,1601. Using 
the 1986 price of 70 k USD/t the loss 
would be 26.5 M USD for Bl (plan) and 
11.2'M USD for B2 (no change). Given 
the adequate reserve base and the fact 
that the plant had already been pur­
chased, it would be reasonable to as­
sume that scenario Bl would have been 
achieved under normal conditions.
Cement: Between 1977 and 1980 ce- s 
ment production averaged 298 kt/an- 
num and exports 144 kt/annum (48 per 
cent). From 1982, due to attacks on the 
limestone quarries, output declined rap- ‘
idly to a mere 85 kt in 1985. Again using 
a production-to-plan and a no-change 
scenario (Cl and C2, Fig 3).since 1981, 
“ forfeited output due to destabilization 
would be 1 022 kt for Cl (plan, Table 5) 
and 640 kt for C2 (no-change). In 1981 
cement was exported for 48.7 USD/t or 
59 deflated USD. Forfeited output 
would therefore be worth roughly 6 M 
USD (Cl, plan) or 3.8 M USD (C2, no­
change) of which 48 percent would have 
been exported giving a foreign exchange 
loss of 2.9 M USD (Cl) or 1.8 M USD 
(C2).
Other minerals: production of min­
erals such as felspar, semi-precious 
stones, bentonite and asbestos has fallen 
drastically since 1981, but it would be 
difficult to work out the loss in value 
due to a lack of data except for semi­
precious stones where the loss for 1986 
alone is estimated at 2 M USD.14 A 
rough estimate for the period. 1981 to 
1986 would be in the region of 15 M 
USD.
The total value of planned forfeited 
mineral production due to destabiliza­
tion by the RSA from 1981 would be of 
the order of 240 M USD, 98 per cent in 
foreign exchange, three times the total 
value of Mozambique’s exports in 1985.
• Transport
The destruction of the Moatize-Beira 
line has caused all coal production to be 
lost rather than a premium to be paid by
using alternative routes. The ports of 
Beira and Maputo are the cheapest 
routes for the export of minerals from 
“ Zimbabwe and ZainbiaTSabotage oftfie 
routes has therefore caused these coun­
tries to use more expensive South Afri­
can (or other) routes and has denied 
Mozambique the port and rail tariffs it 
would have otherwise received.
There are clearly many other knock- 
on effects of declining mineral produc­
tion such as the effect on the construc­
tion industry of severe shortages 
brought about by the closure of the 
limestone quarries. The asbestos-ce­
ment plant output declined 75 per cent 
from 1980 to 1984 due to cement and/or 
asbestos shortages. Although small in 
comparison to Angola, forfeited mine­
ral export losses have had a relatively 
greater effect on the rest of the import 
consuming economy as Mozambique 
has not had an unaffected mineral, such 
as oil, to make up the forex shortfall.
The land-locked economies: 
the secondary targets
The mineral producing states of the in­
terior, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland 
and Botswana, have not suffered direct 
attacks on mines as have the coastal 
states of Angola and Mozambique, but 
due to the destruction of the transport 
routes by the RSA and/or surrogates, 
their exports are forced to leave via more
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Bridge in Mozambique destroyed by the 
MNR in 1985.
distant South African ports (Richards 
Bay, Durban and Port Elizabeth). 
Therefore only the RSA transport 
premium and possible minerals 
development opportunity loss will be 
considered here:
Botswana
\ Most of Botswana’s mineral production 
is high value diamonds which are air­
freighted, while the copper/nickel matte 
is exported to Zimbabwe to be toll-re­
fined by Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZim, 
RTZ of UK) and Bindura Nickel Cor­
poration (BNC, AAC of SA). Therefore 
Botswana’s minerals industry has not 
been affected overtly by RSA destabi­
lization except that the extra expense in 
getting the toll-refined copper and 
nickel to more distant South African 
ports will be reflected in the price they 
receive for the matte from the Swiss pur~ 
chasers (Centametal). Botswana has 
suffered several SADF raids in the past 
two years, ostensibly aimed at ANC 
houses in the capital Gaborone, but 
these have hardly affected their minerals 
industry.
The development of the Sua Pan pot­
ash deposit would be dependent on the 
South African market, but South Africa 
is making any agreement on this project 
dependent on Botswana signing a Nko-
which are secure due to the security 
situation. In general the Swazi regime 
appears to be willing to collaborate with 
the RSA, and accordingly have not been 
directly destabilized.
Zimbabwe
Before the application of sanctions 
against the Rhodesian settler regime by 
Mozambique in 1976, the majority of 
Zimbabwe’s exports were routed via the 
closest ports of Beira and Maputo. 
After the independence of Zimbabwe in 
1980 an attempt was made to reopen 
these routes, but due to South 
African/MNR sabotage and attacks, by 
1986 the Maputo (Chiqualaquala) line 
was completely out of action while the 
Beira line was operating at only one 
train per day, though a major project to 
upgrade the latter line is in progress. 
From January l983 to-June l984 this - 
line suffered a total of 106 attacks and 
derailments in which 19 locos and 127 
wagons were damaged.15 The security 
situation has, however, improved since 
then with the deployment of Zimbab­
wean troops in Mozambique.
When the Chiqualaquala line was in 
operation in 1983 it cost 45 ZWD/t to 
transport steel/ferro-chrome via the
port of Maputo. The current rate via the 
RSA (Durban) is 58 ZWD/t, therefore 
the extra cost would be about 13 
ZWD//t. Total steel and ferro-chrome 
exports run at roughly 500 kt/year giv­
ing a total value for the RSA transport 
premium against the Chiqualaquala 
route of 4 M USD/year. Currently some 
steel is being shipped out via the even 
cheaper Beira route at 30.47 ZWD/t, or 
27.53 ZW D/t less than the Durban 
route.1S. Compared to Beira, the export 
premium for ferro-chrome and steel 
would come out at 8.3 M USD/year or 
33.2 M USD over the last four years.
The current cost for exporting asbest­
os through Durban is 60.7 ZWD/t (36.4 
USD) while the rate to Beira is 45.13 
ZWD/t (27.1 USD), giving a premium 
of 9.3 USD/t. Asbestos exports run at 
roughly 160 kt/year meaning that the 
premium in relation-to-Beira is-l;5- M- 
USD/year or 6 M USD over the last four 
years. The premium per ton in relation 
to Chiqualaquala-Maputo would be 
similar to that of steel/ferro-chrome.
In 1984 Zimbabwean mineral exports 
were in excess of 1.3 Gt (Table 6), but it 
should be noted that much of this was 
within the region, especially for coal,
mati- style accord. In this sense there 
could have been an opportunity loss due 
to the RSA’s machinations. Likewise the 
development of Botswana’s huge coal 
reserves might well have gone ahead had 
the regional security climate been more 
condusive.
Swaziland
The asbestos from Havelock mine has 
always been exported via the RSA so it 
.cannot be said that Swaziland has suf­
fered  a RSA transport premium in this 
regard. However it could be argued that 
they have suffered an opportunity loss 
48 the development of their, coal 
resources is dependent on the reliable 
operation o f the line to Maputo and the 
Matola bulk cargo terminal, neither of
Table 6
Zimbabwe: selected mineral exports 1980 & 1984
1980 1984
Mineral kt M ZWD kt M ZWD
Ferro-chrome 257.3 79.5 209.7 154.9
Asbestos 274.3 80.1 155.4 74.0
Nickel 14.5 52.8 11.3 . 63.0
Steel 576.3 76.4 480.1 55.7
Copper 22.7 24.6 21.5 31.1
Tin 0.9 8.6 0.9 16.6
Coke 113.4 6.4 102.3 11.2
Cement 62.7 1.9 164.4 7.6
Coal 229.5 3.9 174.8 5.2
Lithium ores 18.4 1.7 23.8 5.1
Graphite — — 12.0 3.1
Tonnage 1 570.0 1356.2
Source:
Central Statistical Office of Zimbabwe: Quarterly Digest o f Statistics, December 1985.
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coke and cement, where almost all went 
to regional customers, and steel. A 
rough estimate of exports destined for 
overseas markets would be in the region 
of 730 kt/year. An approximate estima­
tion of the premium above the Beira cost 
would be 20 M USD/year or 80 M USD 
over the last four years, while the premi­
um above the Maputo cost cannot be es­
timated as there have been no rates for 
this route since 1983.
A SADCC study at the end of 1985 
estimated a total saving (all exports) for 
Zimbabwe of 187 M USD/year through 
the use of Mozambican instead of 
South African ports. Paradoxically the 
saving for Malawi would be even greater 
at 266 M USD, yet that country con­
tinues to do the RSA’s bidding by sup­
porting MNR banditry.17
The effect of the higher transport cost 
on the profitability and hence output of 
the Zimbabwean mining companies 
would be impossible to estimate; suffice 
it to note that most of the non-gold 
companies are operating at low profit 
margins if not making losses. The effect 
of South African destabilization on the 
inflow of foreign capital into the mining
52
industry can again not be calculated as 
it would be impossible to determine 
whether the lack of investment was due 
to the percieved regional security situa­
tion or to the general slow down in min­
ing investment world-wide since 1980, 
but it is possible that Zimbabwe’s coal 
production would have been expanded 
for overseas export had the Chiquala- 
quala line been operating effectively.
Due to South African destabilization 
of the south-west of the country via so- 
called "Super Zapu” bandits and the 
need to secure the Beira corridor, Zim­
babwe has recently announced the ex­
pansion of her army and the introduc­
tion of military conscription. This is yet 
another extra expense provoked by 
South Africa’s strategy of regional 
destabilization, and one that Zimbabwe 
could well do'without.
Zambia
As a mining economy situated in the 
centre of the region, Zambia has prob­
ably suffered the most from’transport 
route disruptions. Pre-1975 Zambia’s 
main routes were to Lobito (Benguela 
line), the Mozambican ports and the
South African ports, but the latter two 
routes went through the then Rhodesia. 
Due to border closures by the Rhode­
sian regime, Zambia was at times forced 
to export its copper by air and more 
commonly, by road (to Dar es Salaam). 
In the late sixties, due to the instability 
of the southern route and increasing 
guerrila activity on the Benguela line in 
Portuguese Angola, Zambia and Tan­
zania decided to construct a line from 
the copperbelt to Dar es Salaam (the 
Tazara line) which was completed by 
The Peoples Republic of China in 1975.
Zambia exports between 530 and 600 
kt of copper yearly, almost all to over­
seas markets. Smaller amounts of lead, 
zinc and cobalt are also exported (about 
40 kt/year). In 1984/85 of all metals 
despatched 79 per cent went via Dar es 
Salaam and 21 per cent via East London 
in the RSA.18
Zambia’s cheapest route is via Lobito 
which has been out of action since the 
South African invasion of Angola in 
1975, due to sabotage by the SADF/ 
UNITA. The next cheapest is via Beira, 
but the capacity of this line is still low 
due to SADF/MNR sabotage.
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Anodes awaiting treatment in the 
refinery stacked in the storage yard at 
Ndola Copper Refinery, Zambia.
The current cost of exporting copper 
via East London is 443 ZAK/t (64 
USD), via Beira 411 ZAK/t (59 USD) 
and via Dar es Salaam 247 ZAK/t (35.6 
USD). As Lobito has not been used for 
ten years there are no current rates for it 
but it is estimated that they would be 
about 50 per cent of those for Dar es 
Salaam, or roughly 18 USD/t.19
Total Zambian copper exports for the 
period 1975 to 1986 are of the order of 
7.3 Mt. Using the 21:79 ratio between 
East London and Dar es Salaam, the 
average current rate is 41.6 USD/t. The 
transport premium paid by Zambia, due 
to the closure of the Benguela line, 
would therefore be 23.6 USD/t, or a 
total of 172.3 M USD since 1975 on 7.3 
Mt of copper exported.
Due to the depressed world market 
price for copper, the Zambian mining 
industry has been operating with little 
or no profit margin. The absence of this 
transport premium therefore may well 
havemade asignificant difference toits 
profitability resulting in an expansion 
o f production, rather than a reduction 
as has been the case.
Conclusion
This paper has looked at only three, 
generally quantifiable, effects of South 
African destabilization on the minerals 
sector of the SADCC namely:
• Direct destruction of mining in­
stallations.
• Lost production from reductions in 
output, and
• Extra transport costs due to the 
destruction of preferred routes.
The effects of mineral output reduc­
tions on downstream and upstream in­
dustries have not been looked at. Like­
wise, the effect of reduced exchange 
earnings on the economies as a whole 
has not been analysed and neither has 
the significant effect of the diversion of 
resources to defence been determined. 
The paper has kept strictly to its brief, 
the effects of destabilization on the 
minerals industries only.
In terms of direct destruction of min­
ing installations, this form of destabili­
zation has only been experienced by An­
gola and Mozambique. Published fig­
ures for the value of this destruction are 
not available, but a rough estimate 
would be between 100 and 200 M USD.
Forfeited mineral production for 
Mozambique and Angola due to output 
reductions would total about 4.5 G 
USD. A staggering amount when con­
sidered against the poverty of these two 
states.
The extra transport costs resulting 
from the sabotage of the most economi­
cal export routes for Zimbabwe and 
Zambia are roughly 33 M USD/year or a 
total of 252 M USD. Given the depress­
ed international minerals market this 
extra transport cost burden could be 
crucial factor to the continued profit­
ability of the mining industries con­
cerned.
In general, with the -exception of 
“ precious mihefalsTthe mihmg industries ~ 
of the SADCC have been stagnating or 
declining since the start of the world 
recession in 1980. In real (terms of trade) 
terms most minerals are worth less than 
half their 1980 value and only by con­
stant devaluations of the national cur­
rencies and resulting declining real earn­
ings of mineworkers, have many of the 
mineral industries been able to survive. 
The added cost of South African ag­
gression could therefore not have come 
at a worse time.
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